Libertarianism Violates Egalitarianism

I don't believe it is a controversial assertion that the foundation and core of libertarianism is the 'harm principle', which states that one should have the freedom to do whatever they wish as long as it doesn't harm other people. The precise way that libertarians adopt this axiom is relatively hazy and unclear: partly because opinions genuinely differ, and partly because one's adoption of the idea tends to be based on their emotional resonance with it rather than a specifically articulated doctrine (Which I wish to emphasise is not a criticism per se, but more a statement on general belief rather than libertarians specifically). It tends to be taken either as a heuristic that someone gives great weight to when making judgements about where state power should be extended, or a foundational principle which itself determines the correct extension of state power. There's much I can say about this principle - that whilst its popularity is justified in that in its simplicity it is an incredible heuristic in evaluating quickly what powers the state should have over individuals, on an absolutely theoretical level it is horrific. But I wish to quickly detail how it violates egalitarianism, with the fact it contradicts an even more essential political and human principle calling for its reassessment.

The foundation of the harm principle is that it calls for an attitude where an individual values themselves less than other people, and hence violates the fact of universal human equality. This disjunct can be put simply: if I give you a drink laced with ricin I have committed a grave offence, yet if I give myself a drink laced with ricin that is a morally-neutral decision - and yet aren't we equal people who are suffering the same harm? Clearly consent is an important distinction, but then the correct reaction is that my drinking of ricin is not as immoral, not morally-neutral. Why is causing harm to you a grave and unforgivable offence, but causing harm to myself is utterly irrelevant? The only way to conceptualise such a position from a personal position is that the wellbeing of other people is more important then your own, yet such demeaning of yourself is a violation of treating everyone equally - hence you have a responsibility to yourself. If the golden rule is to treat other people like you would want to be treated, this is reversible in that you should treat yourself how you think other people should be treated, and nobody wants to be treated in a way that they perceive as being harmful to themselves.

As far as I can tell the only escape out of this trap is either to deny that 'good' exists, or to undermine egalitarianism as an important principle. Denying that goodness exists seems an utterly foolish approach to me, for then it brings into question why we care about causing harm to other people in the first place. In what sense can you cause harm to someone if we deny the idea of harm itself? If there is no ill for them to come under, if there is no objective suffering, then why would they oppose having their free will violated? The principle becomes a detached line of reasoning with no justification for why people should follow such a principle. The typical response is something akin to "who are you to say what's good for someone?"; but for an individual to be able to say what's good for them there must be some real worl objective good, and hence accessible for other people to comment upon. There's a reason it's called the 'harm' principle, to remove the idea of harm renders the entire concept incoherent. Potentially we should devalue or undermine egalitarianism, but such would be difficult when it is deeper and more entrenched than the harm principle. On a factual level the relationship between me and you is that we are both conscious beings, and we are aware of eachothers consciousness - this is the foundation of our egalitarian relationship. My suffering is as important as your suffering since foundationally our experience of suffering is equal. What is the foundation of the harm principle? Typically it relies on the idea that the individual knows best for themselves, which if you're honest with yourself you know isn't true, people are self-destructive all the time - the ability to self-destruct is literally what is trying to be defended. Undermining egalitarianism is a faulty solution when it is more solid than what is trying to be asserted.

There is a line of argument which I am not as certain in it's validity, but I wish to briefly address as I get the sense there is an important sense of truth here. In that it seems the idea of the 'individual' is itself somewhat of a misnomer, of which I am not so confident can be isolated in such a manner. The clearest distinction is that who I am currently is a very different person to who I am in the future, and whilst its certainly instinctive, it's not so evident why the continuity of one's physical body should be prioritised over the disconituity over one's 'self' - especially in a culture where one's internal self is typically celebrated over their externality. If I chain smoke ciggarettes I am condemning a future me, who I have no current connection towards, to suffer tremendously for my actions. We can even use the language that you lack the capacity to consent to future self-harm, considering no person is capable of meaningfully weighing up future pain with present pleasure. Even we wish to go to radical levels, can we even say that there exists an 'individual'? What we understand as the 'self' in reality is an amelgemation of a variety of 'cognitive forces', hence can one part of the self do harm to another? I clearly do not conceptualise my intrusive thoughts as belonging to 'me', and I treat them as if separate from myself. Is there not a meaningful way then that I can say my intrusive thoughts harmed myself, and this consistitutes harm to a separate individual? This may not seem as absurd when compared to the phenomenon of spirit possession, which essentially the same idea but in a grander and more dramatic form - one cannot be blamed for actions under a possessive state because another actor is utilising their body. Why then are we so absolutely certain that the same doesn't apply to our own minds, of which the only union is acting through the same body?